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Abstract:   We provide evidence on the costs and profitability of relationship lending by banks.
We derive bank-specific measures of loan rate smoothing for small business borrowers in
response to exogenous shocks to their credit risk and to interest rates, and then estimate cost
and profit functions to examine how smoothing affects bank costs and profits.
Our results suggests that, in general, loan rate smoothing in response to a credit risk shock is
not part of an optimal long-term contract between a bank and its borrower, while loan rate
smoothing in response to an interest rate shock is.
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1.  Introduction
For some market participants, the financing of small businesses has become a type of Holy Grail in the
fiercely competitive financial markets of the 1990s.  In particular, many commercial banks—both large and
small—have identified small business lending as a core business; this, at a time in which it has become
increasingly difficult for all intermediaries to defend their traditional markets against increasing competition both
from traditional and non-traditional competitors.
Different banks have offered different visions of the future direction of small business lending.  In one
view—espoused especially by larger banks—credit-scoring models and securitization remake the small business
lending market in the image of the consumer loan market.  We can refer to this type of lending as transactional
lending.  In another view, commercial banks—especially small banks—retain dominance in the small business
loan market by exploiting a traditional strength: relationship lending, characterized by close monitoring,
renegotiability, and implicit long-term contractual agreements.  Needless to say, these two visions are not
mutually exclusive; in the foreseeable future both types of lending will coexist and commercial banks will
continue to retain a significant share of the small business loan market.  However, the relative importance of
transactional and relationship lending and the continuing dominance of commercial banks in the small business
lending market as a whole are very much open questions.
In this paper we seek to provide some evidence on the costs and profitability of relationship lending by
commercial banks, key elements in answering either question.  We draw upon recent research that has given
empirical support for loan rate smoothing as one of the distinctive features of relationship lending by banks.  
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Berger and Udell (1992) provide empirical evidence that banks smooth loan rates in response to interest rate
shocks while Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Berlin and Mester (1997) provide evidence that banks smooth loan
rates in response to changes in a firm’s credit risk.  All three papers support the idea that loan rate smoothing
arises as part of optimal (perhaps implicit) contracts between borrowers and banks.  Our own results and those2
of Petersen and Rajan also suggest that bank monopoly power may be a precondition for such contracts and that
increasing competition may hinder relationship lending.
We take a two-step approach in this paper.  In the first step, we generate measures of the degree of
smoothing for each bank by estimating regression equations relating the markups on a bank’s small business
loans to changes in various measures of aggregate credit risk and interest rates, along the lines of Berger and
Udell (1992) and Berlin and Mester (1997).  In the second step, we estimate multiproduct cost and (alternative)
profit functions for banks, including the bank-specific degree of smoothing.   We then investigate the effect on
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cost and profit of a higher degree of smoothing.  We also examine whether the relationships between loan rate
smoothing and bank costs or profits have changed over time and whether these relationships depend on bank
size.
For the most part, our results offer little support for the interpretation that loan rate smoothing in
response to credit risk shocks arises as part of an optimal contracting scheme.  The predominant pattern in our
results is that banks that offer smoother loan rates have lower costs and lower profits, a pattern that is difficult to
reconcile with models of efficient multiperiod contracts.  These results are more consistent with a view, common
among practitioners, that bank loan-pricing practices have historically been inefficient, in particular, that loan
rates have traditionally been too insensitive to credit risk.
In contrast, we find that— except for small banks—loan rate smoothing in response to interest rate
shocks is associated with higher costs and higher profits, which is consistent with the hypothesis that smoothing
is part of an optimal contracting scheme (as in Fried and Howitt, 1980).
The paper proceeds as follows.  We present our hypotheses in more detail in the next section.  In Section
3 we describe the data, and in Sections 4 and 5 we describe our empirical methodology.  We present and interpret
our empirical results in Sections 6 and 7, and conclude in the final section.3
2.  Hypotheses
For heuristic purposes it may be helpful to organize our thinking around two hypotheses about patterns
of costs and profits.  The efficient contracting hypothesis views loan rate smoothing as the outcome of an
optimal contract between a borrower and its bank.  Loan rate smoothing might be optimal for a number of
reasons.  Reduced liquidation costs (Berlin and Mester, 1997) or avoidance of credit rationing (Petersen and
Rajan, 1995) are reasons that have been offered for loan rate smoothing in response to adverse credit risk shocks. 
Fried and Howitt (1980) provide a formal model that views loan rate smoothing as part of an optimal contract
for risk-averse firms facing interest rate risk.  Whatever motivation one stresses, if the loan rate smoothing
aspect of relationship lending is valuable to the borrower, then it might be expected to generate profits for the
bank, as long as loan markets are not perfectly competitive.  Thus, we expect banks with a higher degree of
smoothing would be more profitable.
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The prediction of efficient contracting for costs is not as straightforward.  To the extent that a bank can
offer smoother rates and remain profitable at the same time only by expending real resources, we might expect
banks with a higher degree of smoothing to have higher costs.  For example, making loans at concessionary rates
in periods of high credit risk may require costly monitoring to identify those firms that will survive to pay
compensatory rates in better times.   And the provision of interest rate risk insurance will typically require some
type of costly hedging activity by the bank.  At the same time, it is not hard to envision scenarios in which loan
rate smoothing reduces costs.  For example, in a Stiglitz-Weiss type world, where high loan rates increase a
firm’s incentive to take inefficient risks, different banks might respond differently to high market interest rates. 
One bank might engage in costly monitoring to overcome information asymmetries while another might keep
rates low to reduce the firm’s incentives to take risks.  The second type of bank would have smoother rates and
lower costs than the first type of bank.
An alternative hypothesis has had more explicit support among practitioners and in the business press4
than in the academic literature.  In this view, many bank lending practices—including the smoothing of loan
rates—are inefficient.   In a typical statement from a former columnist at the American Banker, “In other words,
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banks are awakening to the fact that they have been overcharging and thus alienating those who provide the
highest risk adjusted returns and undercharging those who produce returns below the hurdle rate.  Otherwise put,
at most banks, the better customers have been subsidizing the poorer ones.” (Rose, 1990)  This cross-
subsidization is not part of an efficient intertemporal agreement, as in Petersen and Rajan (1995), but reflects
incorrect pricing, just one of many obsolete banking practices that have flourished in protected and
noncompetitive markets.  We will call this view the inefficient pricing hypothesis.   An implication of this view
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is that the banker who gets his loan rates right (i.e., is not smoothing) should increase his profits.  Thus,
smoothing should be associated with lower profits.
6,7
The implication of inefficient pricing for the relationship between smoothing and costs is also
ambiguous.  In one view, loan rates that imperfectly reflect default risk are merely one among a host of
inefficiencies arising in protected markets, which would lead us to expect a positive relationship between
smoothing and costs.  Alternatively, the simple rules of thumb said to underlie inefficient bank loan pricing
might be less costly than a more sensitive mechanism for assigning borrowers to appropriate risk classes.  In this
view, costs may be lower for banks that do more smoothing, at least in the short run.
Summarizing the preceding: According to the efficient contracting hypothesis, we expect loan rate
smoothing to be positively related to profits, while according to the inefficient pricing hypothesis, we expect loan
rate smoothing to be negatively related to profits.  There are no definite predicted relationships between loan rate
smoothing and costs.  (Nonetheless, information about the empirical relationship between smoothing and costs
should yield information about the source of the effect on profits, i.e., whether it is via revenues or cost.) 
We consider explicitly the possibility that the relationship between smoothing and profitability or costs
may have changed over time or that the relationship might differ for banks of different sizes.  For example,5
greater liability-side competition (as in Berlin and Mester, 1997) or greater asset-side competition (as in Petersen
and Rajan, 1995) will make relationship lending increasingly less feasible over time.  Along with many other
observers, we view the 1980s as a period of increasing competition.  Findings consistent with the efficient
contracting hypothesis earlier, but not later, in our sample period would be consistent with the view that greater
competition tends to undermine relationship lending.  
There are also a number of reasons to expect that smaller banks are more likely to engage profitably in
lending relationships than larger banks, even holding constant average borrower size, the liability structure of the
bank, and the bank’s degree of monopoly power (all of which should independently affect the profitability of
relationship lending).  The enforceability of implicit contracts may be more difficult in large banking
organizations, where more bureaucratic loan review structures may limit lender autonomy or where lenders’
career paths undermine long-term personal relationships with borrowers.
But other reasons suggest that the profitability of loan rate smoothing may be positively related to bank
size.  First, larger banks have a greater capacity to hedge interest rate risk at low cost than do small banks.  But
even before the advent of credit risk derivatives, larger banks with diversified portfolios of firms might have had
an advantage over smaller banks in providing insulation against aggregate credit shocks as well.  This is
especially true if the aggregate shocks have different regional or sectoral effects (and large banks diversify across
regions and sectors).
3.  Data
Our data cover the same panel of 126 banks investigated in Berlin and Mester (1997).  These banks are
those that reported in the Federal Reserve System’s Quarterly Survey of the Terms of Bank Lending in each
quarter from 1977Q1 through 1989Q4.   This survey collects information on the terms of each loan the bank
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made in a particular three- to five-day period near the beginning of the quarter.  The entire sample of loans
included over 600,000 loans that were priced above the prime rate.    We augmented these data with information
9MARKUPijt ’ a0j % a1jCREDIT RISKjt % bXijt,
MARKUPijt ’ c0j % c1jMMRijt % dXijt,
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on the banks’ balance sheets and income statements, which we drew from the banks’ quarterly Reports of
Condition and Income (the Call Reports).  The banks’ average asset-size over our sample period ranged from
$50 million to $137 billion (1982 dollars).
4.  Estimating the Degree of Smoothing




where i refers to the loan, j refers to the bank, and t refers to the quarter.  We estimated each regression using all
of the banks’ small business loans that were priced above the prime rate.  For our purposes, a small business
loan was one whose face value was less than $1 million and, if it was made under commitment or sold as a
participation, the total commitment or total participation was also less than $1 million.  There are over 480,000
such loans in our sample.  MARKUP is the difference between the loan rate and the rate on a Treasury security
that had the same duration as the loan.   To estimate (1) we used two alternative measures of credit risk: the
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quality spread (QUALSP) is the difference in rates between Moody’s Aaa-rated bonds and Baa-rated bonds, and
the state unemployment rate (UNEMPST) is the unemployment rate in the state where the bank was
headquartered.  QUALSP has the benefit of being a forward-looking measure of credit risk, but since it does not
vary across banks, this measure does not incorporate much of the local variation in credit risk that is likely to be
important to our small business borrowers.  UNEMPST has the benefit of varying both across time and
banks—thus capturing a lot of the cross-sectional information in our sample—but it can be a lagging indicator of
credit risk.    The variable, MMR, used in regression (2) is the rate on a Treasury security with the same
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duration as the loan. 
The vector X is a set of control variables that affect markups.  It includes borrower-specific control7
variables: whether the loan was collateralized, whether it was made under commitment, the loan’s face value,
whether the loan was made at a fixed or floating rate, and the loan’s duration.  It also includes bank-specific
control variables: the average asset size of the bank (in real terms) over the sample period, the bank’s average
loan-to-deposit ratio, its average equity-to-asset ratio, the level of loan charge-offs to total loans two and three
years after the loan was made (as controls for credit standards), the bank’s core deposits as a fraction of total
deposits, and the Herfindahl index for the bank’s deposit markets.  MMR was included as a control variable in
regression (1) and QUALSP was included as a control in regression (2).  A time trend was also included in both
regressions.
Note that in regressions (1) and (2), both the constant terms, a  and c , and the coefficients on CREDIT 0j    0j
RISK and MMR, a  and c , respectively, were allowed to vary over banks.  The estimates of this coefficient in 1j    1j
regression (1) for each of our two alternative measures of credit risk, QUALSP and UNEMPST, provide two
potential measures of loan rate smoothing in response to credit shocks, while the estimate of the coefficient on
MMR in regression (2) provides a measure of loan rate smoothing in response to interest rate shocks.  In each
case, a smaller coefficient corresponds to more smoothing.  So, we define two measures of the degree of credit-
risk smoothing: SMOOTHQ is !1 times the estimated coefficient on QUALSP for bank j and SMOOTHU is j                          j
!1 times the estimated coefficient on UNEMPST for bank j.  Similarly, we define SMOOTHM as !1 times the j
estimated coefficient on MMR for bank j.   Higher values for SMOOTHQ, SMOOTHU, and SMOOTHM
indicate more smoothing.
5.  Cost and Alternative Profit Function Specifications
To investigate the costs and profitability of loan rate smoothing, we estimate variable cost and profit
functions that include our measure of smoothing in response to a credit shock and the associated credit risk
measure, or our measure of smoothing in response to an interest rate shock and the one-year Treasury bill rate.  
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Instead of a standard profit function, which relates profit to input prices and output prices, we estimate the8
alternative profit function, which relates profit to input prices and output levels (and other control variables). 
This is because one of the avenues by which smoothing affects profits is via the price of loans; therefore, we do
not want to hold output prices constant when evaluating the impact of smoothing on profits.
Since our sample includes only 126 banks, we needed a parsimonious specification of costs and profits
and used a modified version of the Berger and Mester (1997) specification.  Thus, we specified two outputs: y  = 1
gross loans and leases and y  = all other assets less fixed assets.  There are two variable inputs: purchased funds 2
(i.e., large time deposits, foreign deposits, fed funds purchased, and all other liabilities except core deposits),
whose price, w , is proxied by expenses for these funds divided by the volume of these funds; and labor, whose 1
price, w , is proxied by salaries and benefits divided by number of employees.  We include three fixed netputs 2
(factors that have aspects of both inputs and outputs) in the cost and profit functions: core deposits, defined as
domestic deposits minus large time deposits; fixed assets, which includes premises and other fixed assets; and
financial capital.   We also include one environmental variable, the ratio of the bank’s level of net chargeoffs of
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loans and leases to total gross loans and leases.   In addition, our specification includes the degree of loan rate
14
smoothing, SMOOTHQ, SMOOTHU, or SMOOTHM along with the associated measure of credit risk
(QUALSP or UNEMPST) or the one-year T-bill rate.   This procedure allows the degree of smoothing to affect
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cost and profits differently at different levels of credit risk or at different levels of interest rates.   Variable cost
16
is measured as the sum of expenditures on the two variable inputs, i.e., expense of purchased funds, and
expenditures on salaries and benefits.  Variable profit is revenue from loans and assets other than fixed assets
minus variable cost.   Finally, we also allow for a time trend and include a trend variable and its square.  To
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conserve degrees of freedom, we did not interact these trend variables with any of the others.
We assumed the cost and profit functions were of the translog functional form, and we estimated the
purchased funds (cost or profit) input share equation, along with the cost and profit function.  (The input share
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was used to obtain the estimates, so they are invariant to the share equation dropped.)  Hence, the model
estimated was as follows:
(3)
(4)
V = variable cost or variable profit
y = quantity of output i, i=1,2 i
w  = price of variable input j, j=1,2 j
z = degree of smoothing: SMOOTHQ, SMOOTHU, or SMOOTHM 1
z   = credit risk—QUALSP or UNEMPST, or one-year T-bill rate 2
z = core deposits 3
z = physical capital 4
z = financial equity capital 5
z = net chargeoffs of loans and leases/total gross loans and leases 610
TR = time trend
S = purchased funds input share, i.e., expenditures on purchased funds divided by variable 1
cost or profit
,, >  are normally distributed error terms t   1t
and all variables (except the shares) are normalized by their means.
We estimated the cost and profit functions over our sample period from 1977Q1-89Q4.  While the trend
and trend-squared variables (and credit risk and market rate variables) allow for some movement of the cost and
profit functions over time, we also divided our sample period and estimated separate functions over 1977Q1-
82Q4 and 1983Q1-89Q4.  This allows us to investigate whether the effect of smoothing on profits and cost has
changed over time.   In addition, since there is a body of evidence that suggests that different sized banks may
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use different production technologies, we also estimated separate functions for banks in three different size
categories based on the average real value (in 1982 dollars) of a bank’s assets over 1977Q1-89Q4.  The size
categories were: assets less than $1 billion, assets between $1 billion and $10 billion, and assets over $10 billion. 
These three categories included 43, 67, and 16 banks, respectively.
6.  Empirical Results
6.1 Credit-risk smoothing 
6.1.1 Means and Medians by Smoothing Quartiles.  Our two measures of smoothing are significantly
positively correlated across banks, as expected, but their correlation is not so high that we’d want to proceed with
a single measure: the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 0.48.  In other words, both measures are likely to
provide some independent information.  It is also interesting to note that the correlation between bank size and
loan rate smoothing is not very strong: it is !0.47 for SMOOTHQ, !0.22 for SMOOTHU, and !0.55 for
SMOOTHM.11
Table 2 presents the means and medians of various characteristics of the banks in our sample across the
quartiles defined by the smoothing variable SMOOTHQ.  As can be seen, banks engaging in higher degrees of
smoothing tend to be smaller in size and higher in capitalization.  They are also more reliant on core deposits for
funding, consistent with Berlin and Mester (1997), where we argue that market power over core depositors
enables banks to offer borrowers loan rate smoothing in their loan contracts.  There appears to be only a slight
difference in loan performance for smoothers and nonsmoothers.
6.1.2 Profit and Cost Elasticities.  Table 3 presents our results for the sample period as a whole and
for both subperiods for the total sample of banks.  The first point to note is that both measures of aggregate
credit risk affect profits in the way one would expect, i.e., an increase in either QUALSP or UNEMPST has a
significantly negative effect on profits.  Thus, we can proceed with some confidence that our measures of credit
risk are not unreasonable.  For either measure of credit risk, the coefficient relating the degree of smoothing and
profits is negative and significant, both for the entire sample period and for both subperiods.  Thus, a bank with
a smoother loan rate profile was less profitable throughout the sample period and in both subperiods.  This does
not support the efficient contracting hypothesis.
The effect of smoothing on cost is also consistently and significantly negative.  From this, we can infer
that the negative effect on profits is not the result of excessively high costs associated with loan rate smoothing,
for example, high monitoring costs. 
Table 4 presents results disaggregated by bank size.  For either measure of credit risk, the coefficient
relating risk to profitability has the correct (negative) sign every time it is statistically significant, both for the
entire sample period and for the subperiods (Panels A, B, and C).
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Turning now to the relationship between the degree of smoothing and profitability, we focus on the
small- and medium-size banks because the level of statistical significance for the largest banks is very low (and
because the two credit risk measures yield conflicting results for the largest banks).   For the smallest bank size12
class and for either measure of credit risk, we have a significantly positive relationship between profits and the
degree of smoothing for the first subperiod and a significantly negative relationship for the second subperiod and
for the sample period as a whole (Panel A).  And for the medium-size banks we find a positive relationship for
the second subperiod and for the sample period as a whole, significantly so, when credit risk is measured by the
quality spread.  This offers (partial) support for the efficient contracting hypothesis: that is, for small banks in
the earlier part of our sample period and medium-size banks in the later part of our sample period we cannot
reject the hypothesis that loan rate smoothing was part of an efficient contracting arrangement.   The results for
small banks are consistent with our prior that relationship lending is likely to be most important for smaller
banks and that it is likely to be most feasible under less competitive conditions prevailing earlier in the sample
period.
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The effect of the degree of smoothing on costs is significantly negative for both the small and medium-
size class, for both the entire sample period and both subperiods.
6.2 Interest-rate smoothing
6.2.1 Means and Medians by Quartiles.  Table 5 presents the means and medians of various
characteristics of the banks in our sample across the quartiles defined by the smoothing variable SMOOTHM. 
The results are substantially similar to those for credit-risk smoothing, which is not surprising since the
Spearman rank correlation between SMOOTHM and SMOOTHQ is 0.74.  Banks engaging in higher degrees of
smoothing tend to be smaller in size, higher in capitalization, and also more reliant on core deposits for funding. 
Further, there is only a slight difference in loan performance for smoothers and nonsmoothers.
6.2.2 Price and Cost Elasticities.  The results for our sample of all banks are presented in the first
column of  Table 6.  We expect bank profits to be negatively related to market interest rates, which holds both
for the sample period as a whole and for both subperiods.   In the sample period and both subperiods, interest-
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rate smoothing raises both costs and profits.  This evidence is consistent with the view that smoothing of loan13
rates in the face of interest rate shocks is part of an efficient contract and also that banks that smooth more
undertake costly hedging activities.
Turning now to our results disaggregated by bank size (shown in panels A, B, and C of Table 6), the
effect of higher market rates on bank profits is less consistent.  For medium-size banks, higher market rates
significantly decrease profits for the entire sample period and for both subperiods, as was true for the sample of
all banks.  However, for both small and large banks, higher market rates significantly increase profits for the
sample period as a whole and for the second subperiod (contrary to our expectations).  We have no ready
explanation for the positive relationship, however, since the profit function includes the price of purchased funds
and the level of core deposits as arguments, the positive relationship might indicate that at these banks loan rates
increase more than the cost of core deposits in response to a general increase in market rates.
The effect of interest-rate smoothing on profits is always positive whenever it is significant for medium
and large banks.  The effect is negative (but insignificant) for medium-size banks in the first subperiod.  The
effect is quite different for small banks, where the relationship between smoothing and profits is either negative
or insignificant.  These results are broadly consistent with the joint hypothesis that interest-rate smoothing arises
as part of an efficient contract and that only larger banks have a comparative advantage in providing customers
with interest-rate risk insurance.  With only one exception, the effect of smoothing on costs is also positive for
medium-size and large banks (the exception is an insignificant negative sign for medium-size banks in the
second subperiod).  These results are broadly consistent with the view that banks that provide interest-rate
smoothing for their customers then engage in costly hedging activities.
6.3 Further tests
Under the efficient contracting hypothesis, loan rate smoothing is part of a long-term relationship
between a bank and its borrower.  In any one period, a bank might earn negative profits under this strategy, but
in the long run, the strategy should pay off if it is an equilibrium pricing strategy.  Yet our profit model was14
estimated using quarterly data.  While this should uncover the average relationship between smoothing and
profits, we wanted to determine whether our results were robust to estimating the profit model using averaged
data.  Thus, we reran the regressions using averaged data for 1978-80, 1981-83, 1984-86, and 1987-89.  For the
full sample of banks and for the three size categories there is very little change in results: smoothing is associated
with decreased profits.
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To provide further evidence regarding the relationship between smoothing and cost and profits, we
derived bank-specific measures of cost and profit inefficiency and looked at the relationship between these
measures and smoothing.  To derive the bank-specific cost and profit inefficiency measures, we used the
stochastic frontier approach (see Berger and Mester, 1997) and estimated equation (2) dropping the terms
involving smoothing and including a composite error term, v + u, in place of ,.  The composite error term
consists of a two-sided normally distributed error, v, representing random error and a one-sided half normally
distributed error term, u, representing inefficiency.  Once the cost and profit frontiers were estimated, we used the
expected value of u given v+u and the mode of the conditional distribution of u given v+u as two alternative
measures of bank-specific inefficiency.   We then regressed these bank-specific inefficiency measures on a
23
constant term and smoothing, again estimating for all banks over the full sample period and then separately for
the two subperiods and for banks in the three size categories.  We found that for all banks, both credit risk and
interest rate risk smoothing were significantly associated with greater efficiency.  Further, in those subperiods
and size categories where we had found that credit-risk smoothing was unprofitable, smoothing was also
significantly associated with greater efficiency.  Thus, unprofitable credit-risk smoothing does not appear to be
an indicator of generalized inefficiency at banks.
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6.4 Summary.  We summarize our results as follows:
Our results generally do not support the view that loan rate smoothing as a type of insurance against
credit-risk shocks is part of an efficient contract between banks and borrowers.  For the full sample of banks over15
the full sample period and both subperiods, profits are significantly lower for those banks that offer smoother
loan rate profiles in response to credit-risk shocks.  We do find some support that smoothing could have been
part of an efficient contract for smaller banks in the early subperiod (1977-82), as profitability was significantly
positively related to smoothing in this case.  This is consistent with the view that relationship lending is a small-
bank phenomenon that has become less profitable in recent times as competition has increased.  
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Our results are much more supportive of interest-rate risk smoothing being part of an efficient contract. 
Here we find a significantly positive relationship between profits and smoothing as insurance against interest-
rate shocks for the full sample of banks over the entire sample period and the two subperiods.  Our bank-size
results indicate that it is the larger size banks that find interest-rate risk smoothing to be profitable (although it is
also a costly activity, as smoothing and costs are positively related).  These results might seem surprising to the
extent that one views loan-rate smoothing as an aspect of relationship lending, which is the purview of smaller
banks.  However, larger banks are likely to be better able to hedge interest-rate risk than smaller banks, and this
type of interest-rate risk insurance need not be confined to relationship loan contracts but might be an aspect of
all bank lending.
In the cases where we found that smoothing was not associated with higher profits and, therefore, was
not consistent with efficient contracting, we did not find that smoothing was associated with other inefficiencies
on the part of the banks.  Nor did we find that banks that ranked as being efficient used smoothing as part of an
efficient contract any more so than less efficient banks did.
7.  Some Alternative Explanations
Our heuristic hypotheses of efficient or inefficient pricing practices are clearly not the only possible
explanations for loan-rate smoothing.  And though there is no shortage of practitioners who subscribe to some
version of the inefficient pricing story, this is a story without strong formal micro foundations.  Since we did not
find that credit-risk smoothing is part of efficient contracting on the part of the bank, it is natural to search for16
alternative explanations before placing too much weight on the idea that banks have systematically mispriced
loans, undercharging high-risk borrowers and overcharging low-risk borrowers, especially since we do not find
that credit-risk smoothing is related to general inefficiency on the part of our banks.
The most obvious alternative explanation of smoothing is that it is the result of monopoly power, that is,
banks with smoother rates have more monopoly power in loan markets, everything else equal.  The relationship
between market power and price rigidity is one that has both theoretical and empirical foundations.   To some
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extent, the regressions used to develop the measures of smoothing take loan market power into account.  In
particular, we included loan size, bank size, and deposit market Herfindahl indices in our first stage pricing
regressions from which we derived our smoothing measures.  One might also argue for the inclusion of proxies
for loan market power in the profit and cost equations.  But this is unlikely to explain our results.  If our
measures of the degree of credit-risk smoothing are acting as proxies for monopoly power, then we would expect
a positive relationship between these measures and profitability, contrary to the predominant pattern in our
results.  Alternatively, if monopoly rents were being dissipated in higher costs, as in some versions of the “quiet
life” hypothesis, we would expect to see a systematic positive relationship between smoothing and costs, but we
found a negative relationship between credit-risk smoothing and costs.
Another alternative interpretation of our smoothing variables is that they reflect bank-specific
differences in credit policy or in the riskiness of the bank’s population of borrowers.  Again, our first stage
regressions attempt to control for bank-specific credit policies by including future loan chargeoffs and attempt to
control for differences in borrower risk characteristics by including contract terms that other studies have shown
to be related to borrower risk, especially whether the loan is collateralized and whether it is granted under
commitment.   Further, bank-specific differences in the relationship between changes in credit risk and portfolio
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risk should also be captured by the bank-specific constant term in our first stage regressions.  Our second stage
cost and profit regressions also control for the bank’s portfolio risk by including the ratio of current net17
chargeoffs to loans and leases.  Nonetheless, one might argue that these are imperfect controls for the riskiness of
the bank’s portfolio.
But the view that we have imperfectly controlled for bank portfolio risk—and that banks with a
smoother loan rate profile are more diligent in increasing the stringency of their credit screens in response to
adverse credit shocks—is also difficult to reconcile with our results.  While stricter credit screens when aggregate
risk increases might reduce monitoring costs—which would be consistent with the negative relationship between
credit-risk smoothing and costs that is most prevalent in our results—it is harder to see why smoothing and
profitability should be related negatively, according to this explanation.  One possible explanation might be that
more risk-averse bank owner/managers would use a more stringent credit policy, which would lower both
expected returns and the riskiness of returns.  But two things should be noted: first, in the cost and profit
estimations, we do control for the bank’s financial capital level and this should provide some control for risk
preferences.  Second, our sample of small banks is precisely that group for which the assumption of a risk-averse
owner/manager is most convincing, yet these banks display a positive relationship between credit-risk smoothing
and profitability (for the earlier part of our sample period).  Having said this, the possibility that imperfect
controls for portfolio risk are driving some of our results is a possibility worth exploring more carefully.
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8.  Conclusion
In this paper, we conduct an empirical investigation of the hypothesis that loan rate smoothing in
response to credit shocks and interest rate shocks is part of an efficient contracting scheme, as in Petersen and
Rajan (1995) or Berlin and Mester (1997).  In particular, we construct measures of the degree of smoothing in
response to aggregate credit risk shocks and market interest rate shocks for a panel of banks during the 1977-89
time period.  We then estimate (alternative) profit and cost functions to examine the relationship between
smoothing and banks’ profitability and costs.  We estimate these profit and cost functions for the entire sample
period and for two subperiods; for the entire sample of banks and also for the banks disaggregated by asset size.18
According to the view that smoothing arises as part of a long-term efficient contract between a bank and
its borrowers, we expect that profits will be greater for banks that engage in more smoothing.   Regarding credit-
risk smoothing, we find only limited evidence supporting the efficient contracting hypothesis, specifically, small
banks in the first half of the sample period display a positive relationship between loan-rate smoothing in
response to credit-risk shocks and profitability.  However, the weight of the evidence is against the efficient
contracting hypothesis.  Our results regarding smoothing in response to shocks to market interest rates are more
support of the efficient contracting hypothesis.  Here we find that larger banks that offer this type of smoothing
are more profitable, although it is costly to offer this insurance to borrowers (perhaps because the bank engages
in costly hedging itself).
In the cases that did not support the efficient contracting hypothesis, an alternative explanation
(consistent with the view of many practitioners) is that banks have historically engaged in inefficient pricing
practices, charging excessively low risk premia to high-risk borrowers and excessively high risk premia to low-
risk borrowers.   However, if this were the case, one would expect to find smoothing positively correlated with
other types of inefficiencies at banks, but our inefficiency results do not support this view.   Thus, we feel our
results are contrary to the simple inefficient pricing hypothesis as well.  Given the tiny empirical literature
exploring relationship lending, we view these results as a puzzle and challenge requiring further empirical
testing.19
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Table 1. Variable Definitions
markup (MARKUP) loan rate minus rate on a Treasury security with the same duration as that of the loan,
where duration is calculated as given below
quality spread (QUALSP) yield on Baa-rated long-term bonds minus yield on Aaa-rated long-term bonds
(Moody’s ratings)
state unemployment (UNEMPST) unemployment rate in the state in which the bank is headquartered
money market rate (MMR) rate on a Treasury security with the same duration as that of the loan, where duration is
calculated as given below
trend linear time trend
Borrower-Specific Control Variables:
collateralized = 1 if the loan was collateralized and 0 otherwise
commitment = 1 if the loan was made under a preexisting commitment and 0 otherwise
face value face value of the loan in millions of 1982 dollars
fixed base rate = 1 if loan has a fixed base rate and 0 otherwise
duration duration of the loan in years.  Before 1982, the frequency of interest compounding was not
included in the STBL data set, so for these loans, duration = maturity (if a maturity date was
stated for the loan) and duration = 1/365 (if no maturity date was stated for the loan).  (We also
reran regressions calculating duration assuming frequency of interest compounding was
monthly, using the maturity indicated if a maturity date was stated for the loan or maturity = 1/12
if no maturity date was stated for the loan.  This alternative yielded similar results.)
Bank-Specific Control Variables:
total assets bank’s total assets in millions of 1982 dollars, averaged over the sample period 1977Q1-
1989Q4
loans/deposits bank’s total loans / total deposits, averaged over the sample period 1977Q1-1989Q4
equity/assets bank’s total equity capital / total assets, averaged over the sample period 1977Q1-1989Q4
chargeoffs-2 bank’s net chargeoffs / total loans in the second year after loan is granted
chargeoffs-3 bank’s net chargeoffs / total loans in the third year after loan is granted
core deposits bank’s deposits with denominations less than $100,000 as a fraction of total liabilities, averaged
over the sample period 1977Q1-1989Q4.
Herfindahl weighted-average of Herfindahl indexes in all deposit markets in which bank gets deposits,
where weights are the fraction of deposits bank gets from the market
bank dummy variables dummy variable for each bank21
Table 2.   Means and Medians Across Smoothing Quartiles†
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Less Smoothing More Smoothing
SMOOTHQ <! !2.35 ! !2.35# #SMOOTHQ< ! !2.02# #SMOOTHQ< ! !1.81# #SMOOTHQ
! !2.02 ! !1.81
Total Assets‡ mean
median
$22.6 billion $5.4 billion $2.7 billion $1.7 billion   
(2,3,4)










5.64% 5.96% 6.96% 7.01%
(2,3,4)










48.4% 56.1% 65.2% 68.1%
(2,3,4)








Net Charge Offs/Assets mean
median
0.087% 0.084% 0.077% 0.083%
(3)




Nonperforming Loans & mean
Leases/Assets  median
1.86% 1.46% 1.43% 1.50%
(2,3,4)








† Smoothing quartiles are defined by SMOOTHQ.  The means and medians for all variables are computed for banks over 
1977Q1-89Q4 except for nonperforming loans & leases/assets, which is computed over 1982Q4-89Q4.
‡ In 1982 dollars.
Significantly different from Q1 at the 10% or better level.
1
Significantly different from Q2 at the 10% or better level.
2
Significantly different from Q3 at the 10% or better level.
3
Significantly different from Q4 at the 10% or better level.
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Table 3.  Relationship Between Credit-Risk Smoothing, Profits, and Costs for the Entire Bank Sample†
             Credit Risk Measure
           SMOOTHQ              SMOOTHU
1977-89
Elasticity of Profit with respect to Credit Risk !6.38* !0.0246*
(!2.60) (!5.67)
Elasticity of Profit with respect to Credit-Risk !0.1398* !40.19*
   Smoothing (!4.91) (!6.11)
Elasticity of Cost with respect to Credit-Risk !0.0629* !12.56*
   Smoothing (!6.30) (!5.74)
1977-82
Elasticity of Profit with respect to Credit Risk !11.45* !0.63*
(!4.01) (!6.85)
Elasticity of Profit with respect to Credit-Risk !0.043 !24.77*
   Smoothing (!0.964) (!1.91)
Elasticity of Cost with respect to Credit-Risk !0.069* !26.14*
   Smoothing (!4.05) (!6.18)
1983-89
Elasticity of Profit with respect to Credit Risk !17.56* !0.043
(!2.68) (!7.88)
Elasticity of Profit with respect to Credit-Risk !0.12* !24.4*
   Smoothing (!3.24) (!3.23)
Elasticity of Cost with respect to Credit-Risk !0.036* !11.44*
   Smoothing (!3.18) (!4.76)
† t-statistics in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.      **Statistically significant at the 10% level.23
Table 4.  Relationship Between Credit-Risk Smoothing, Profits, and Costs for Banks by Size†
A.  Banks with Assets Less Than B.  Banks with Assets Between C.  Banks with Assets Greater Than
$1 Billion $1 Billion and $10 Billion $10 Billion
(43 banks)‡  (67 banks)‡ (16 banks)‡
Credit Risk Measure Credit Risk Measure Credit Risk Measure
SMOOTHQ SMOOTHU SMOOTHQ SMOOTHU SMOOTHQ SMOOTHU
1977-89
Elasticity of Profit with respect to 0.619 !0.0096* !2.40 0.0015 !8.26 0.0006
   Credit Risk (0.209) (!2.05) (!0.755) (0.354) (!1.31) (0.036)
Elasticity of Profit with respect to !0.059* !17.01* 0.044* 1.24 !0.088 20.36
   Credit-Risk Smoothing (!2.66) (!2.53) (2.05) (0.192) (!0.564) (0.29)
Elasticity of Cost with respect to !0.097* !14.71* !0.026* !23.64* 0.1125* !28.97*
   Credit-Risk Smoothing (!8.80) (!4.72) (!4.50) (!16.68) (8.16) (!5.13)
1977-82
Elasticity of Profit with respect to !4.199 !0.0017 !2.47 0.0016 !7.85* !0.0745*
   Credit Risk (!1.22) (!0.199) (!0.799) (0.23) (!1.81) (!3.07)
Elasticity of Profit with respect to 0.072* 2.70 !0.081* !1.42 !0.082 !61.56
   Credit-Risk Smoothing (1.99) (0.25) (!2.91) (!0.14) (!0.428) (!0.52)
Elasticity of Cost with respect to !0.131* !13.54* !0.017* !17.32* 0.038* !42.76*
   Credit-Risk Smoothing (!7.35) (!2.92) (!2.06) (!8.72) (2.50) (!7.57)
1983-89
Elasticity of Profit with respect to !16.937* !0.009** 1.262 !0.018* !36.74* !0.084*
   Credit Risk (!2.07) (!1.46) (0.158) (!3.35) (!2.17) (!2.32)
Elasticity of Profit with respect to !0.176* !32.90* 0.1002* 9.143 !0.317 49.74
   Credit-Risk Smoothing (!5.37) (!3.66) (3.38) (1.12) (!0.837) (0.389)
Elasticity of Cost with respect to !0.12* !20.10* !0.021* !26.99* 0.147* !27.61*
   Credit-Risk Smoothing (!8.94) (!5.62) (!2.84) (!13.92) (5.77) (!3.19)
† t-statistics in parentheses.
‡Assets are real assets averaged over 1977Q1-89Q4 in 1982 dollars.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.      **Statistically significant at the 10% level.24
Table 5.   Means and Medians Across Interest-Rate Smoothing Quartiles†
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Less Smoothing More Smoothing




$19.1 billion $5.4 billion $6.6 billion $1.2 billion   
(2,3,4)










5.80% 6.03% 6.44% 7.29%
(2,3,4)










47.7% 57.6% 60.3% 72.0%
(2,3,4)








Net Charge Offs/Assets mean
median
0.081% 0.082% 0.081% 0.087%
0.053% 0.050% 0.044% 0.043%
(2,3,4) (1,3,4) (1,2) (1,2)
Nonperforming Loans & mean
Leases/Assets  median
1.66% 1.40% 1.60% 1.58%
(2)








† Smoothing quartiles are defined by SMOOTHM.  The means and medians for all variables are computed for banks over 
1977Q1-89Q4 except for nonperforming loans & leases/assets, which is computed over 1982Q4-89Q4.
‡ In 1982 dollars.
Significantly different from Q1 at the 10% or better level.
1
Significantly different from Q2 at the 10% or better level.
2
Significantly different from Q3 at the 10% or better level.
3
Significantly different from Q4 at the 10% or better level.
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Table 6.  Relationship Between Interest-Rate Smoothing, Profits, and Costs for All Banks and for Banks by Size†
All Banks A.  Banks with B.  Banks with C.  Banks with
Assets Less Assets Between Assets Greater
Than $1 Billion and Than $10
$1 Billion $10 Billion Billion
(43 banks)‡ (16 banks)‡
 (67 banks)‡
1977-89
Elasticity of Profit with respect to !0.0175*  0.032* -0.01** 0.02**
   Interest Rate Shock (!3.02) (6.4)   (-1.83)  (1.89) 
Elasticity of Profit with respect to 1.12* !0.065 0.80* 1.72*
   Interest-Rate Smoothing (5.2) (!0.49)  (4.75)  (2.05) 
Elasticity of Cost with respect to 0.749* !0.288* 0.03 0.499*
   Interest-Rate Smoothing (10.64) (!4.62) (0.64) (6.2)
1977-82
Elasticity of Profit with respect to !0.55* -0.004 -0.023* -0.02**
   Interest Rate Shock (!6.64) (-0.62) (-3.57) (-1.74)
Elasticity of Profit with respect to 2.066* 0.12 !0.064 8.86*
   Interest-Rate Smoothing (5.19) (0.51) (!0.254) (6.53)
Elasticity of Cost with respect to 1.43* !0.56* 0.202* 0.07
   Interest-Rate Smoothing (10.62) (!5.91) (3.65) (0.85)
1983-89
Elasticity of Profit with respect to !0.015** 0.033* -0.02* 0.042*
   Interest Rate Shock (!1.53) (3.47) (-2.57) (2.08)
Elasticity of Profit with respect to 0.982* !0.358* 1.15* 0.87
   Interest-Rate Smoothing (3.77) (!1.97) (5.69) (0.53)
Elasticity of Cost with respect to 0.479* !0.397* !0.018 0.559*
   Interest-Rate Smoothing (6.09) (!5.17) (!0.35) (4.24)
† t-statistics in parentheses.
‡Assets are real assets averaged over 1977Q1-89Q4 in 1982 dollars.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.      **Statistically significant at the 10% level.26
1. We recognize that there are other aspects of relationship lending, e.g., protection against credit
rationing.
2. The alternative profit function relates profit to input prices and output levels (as opposed to input
prices and output prices).  See below and Berger and Mester (forthcoming) for further discussion.
3. There is ample empirical evidence that loan markets are not perfectly competitive for small business
loans, for example, Hannan (1991).  See Berlin and Mester (1997) for a model in which loan rate
smoothing is positively related to bank profits.
4.  We reiterate that we state this hypothesis primarily for heuristic purposes and recognize its weak
micro foundations, especially the lack of a satisfying rationale for systematic pricing mistakes. 
Nonetheless, empirical findings of large deviations from efficiency (e.g., average cost inefficiency of
20-25 percent) have been routinely documented in the literature.  For a summary of some of these
findings see Berger and Mester (1997).
5.  Broadly consistent with the views of those who propound this view, we use the term inefficient
pricing.  However, there is nothing inherently inefficient about a pricing policy that places a weight
on non-pecuniary considerations.  For example, a pricing policy that takes into account the value of
the personal relationship between the banker and his customer, or for that matter, other business
dealings between the banker and his customer, may maximize joint utility without maximizing
profits.  We might just as well have called this hypothesis, the It’s a Wonderful Life hypothesis.
6.  We are being loose here.  To make this claim about profitability, we must assume that essentially all
banks engage in loan rate smoothing and that there are few banks that engage in an opposite type of
inefficient pricing, increasing firms’ loan rates disproportionately when credit risk increases and
lowering firms’ loan rates disproportionately when credit risk decreases.
7. In the “Wonderful Life” interpretation, we would expect more smoothing and lower profits for those
banks and customers who place more value on non-pecuniary factors.
Notes27
8. We end our sampling period in 1989 to maintain a consistent panel without losing too many banks to
mergers and failures.
9. We restrict attention to above-prime loans because we expect the relationship aspects of lending to
be more important for above-prime borrowers.  See Berlin and Mester (1997) for a more complete
discussion and analysis of the differences between above- and below-prime borrowers.
10. See Table 1 for a full listing and description of all variables.
11. Average borrower size is also larger for larger banks, so local market conditions are likely to be more
important to borrowers of smaller banks.  Accordingly, we tend to weight results using UNEMPST
relatively more heavily, the smaller the bank.   Of course, our sample selection techniques censor
most truly large borrowers, who borrow from multiple banks or have access to money markets and
who produce for national markets.  For such borrowers, a lending bank’s local market conditions are
not likely to be a good measure of credit risk.
12. We use the one-year Treasury bill rate rather than MMR, since MMR is a loan-specific variable and
not a bank-specific variable.
13. Hughes, et al. (1996), among others, argue for the inclusion of financial capital in profit and cost
studies.
14. An alternative would have been the ratio of nonperforming loans and leases to total gross loans and
leases, but nonperforming loans and leases were not available on the Call Reports until 1982Q4.
15. In section 6.3 we discuss the results of a model that allows for X-inefficiency on the part of banks,
omits smoothing as a variable in the model, and drops the share equations to allow for allocative
inefficiencies.
16. Because the number of loans used in obtaining estimates of SMOOTHQ, SMOOTHU, and
SMOOTHM is so large (over 480,000 observations), the standard errors of these estimates are very
small, i.e., the estimates are very precise.  Hence, we can essentially ignore the fact that these terms
are estimated when we enter them into the cost and profit functions.28
17. Because so very few observations involved negative variable profits, we dropped these observations
and used a log-profit specification.
18. Note that over our full sample period, the average ROA and ROE in the commercial banking industry
was 0.84 percent and 14.0 percent, respectively.  Profitability was higher in the earlier subperiod
than in the latter subperiod, with ROA and ROE equal to 0.98 percent and 16.7 percent, respectively,
over 1977-82, and equal to 0.72 percent and 11.7 percent, respectively, over 1983-89.
19. But it should be noted that the statistical relationship between the risk measures and profitability is
typically weak for all but the largest banks.  This is particularly true for the earlier half of our sample
period.
20. The results for medium-size banks are difficult to reconcile with the view that relationship lending is
facilitated by less competitive banking markets.  But we have some doubts about the proper
interpretation of the positive effect of smoothing on profits for medium-size banks, which is
significant only when credit risk is measured by QUALSP and only in the second subperiod.  In this
subperiod, QUALSP has a positive (although insignificant) effect on profits.
21. The negative relationship between profits and market interest rates should hold for two reasons: (i)
Banks’ liabilities are typically of shorter duration than their assets, and (ii) Given the short duration
of most bank loans, the one-year Treasury bill rate is highly correlated with other short-term rates
and may serve as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy.  To the extent that short-term rates
are predictors of GDP growth, as shown in work by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), the distinction
between loan rate smoothing in response to credit-risk shocks and loan rate smoothing in response to
interest-rate shocks is somewhat blurry.
22. The only change in results is that two of the elasticities of profits with respect to smoothing become
insignificant because of decreased degrees of freedom.  Note that because of too few degrees of
freedom, we could not estimate the model over the subperiods with the averaged data.
23. In a few cases the frontier could not be estimated, since the residuals were not skewed in the direction29
predicted by the stochastic frontier approach.
24. To examine this issue further, we identified the more efficient half of our sample (using the
distribution-free approach that gives each bank’s average level of efficiency over the sample period),
and reestimated the profit and cost functions that included smoothing and credit risk or interest rate. 
For this subgroup of more efficient banks, we did not find that the largely negative relationship
between credit-risk smoothing and profitability was reversed.
25. While we also find a significantly positive relationship between smoothing and profits for medium-
size banks in the later subperiod (1983-89) when credit risk is measured by the quality spread, we are
wary of concluding that this is evidence of efficient contracting, because in this case profits are
positively related to credit risk (which seems quite unlikely).
26. See Carlton (1986) for empirical evidence and Rotemberg and Saloner (1987) for a theoretical
model.
27.  Berger and Udell (1990) provide evidence that collateralized loans are granted to riskier borrowers
and Avery and Berger (1991) provide evidence that loans made under commitment are granted to
less risky borrowers.
28. In our earlier paper we found no compelling evidence that loan rate smoothing was being driven by
changes in credit screens.